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under which firms that do not abate voluntarily would support mandatory abatement if they are
able to collectively pass off (at least part of) the costs of abatement to consumers. Our model
predicts that regulatory policies that ignore voluntary abatement are likely to over-regulate
non-abating firms compared to the level of regulation that accounts for voluntary abatement if
consumer income levels in the green market are relatively high. If consumer income levels in the
green market are relatively low, regulation may be ineffective in improving overall environmental
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1 Introduction
Voluntary pollution prevention has been identified as an alternative to traditional regulatory policies
for achieving emissions reductions. This has led to both theoretical and empirical analyses regarding
the motivation, efficiency, and effectiveness of such voluntary agreements. The theoretical literature
has identified several conditions under which firms may voluntarily abate emissions (e.g., Arora and
Gangopadhyay (1995), Segerson and Miceli (1998)) and under which voluntary agreements are most
likely to be successful and efficient in providing improvements in environmental quality (e.g., Wu
and Babcock (1999), Dawson and Segerson (2008)). However, the empirical literature aimed at
determining the participation in and success of such programs has been unable to reach a consensus
(e.g., Khanna and Damon (1999), Vidovic and Khanna (2007)). Nonetheless, it is generally accepted
that a firm will voluntarily abate emissions if the profits obtained under the voluntary abatement
agreement are at least as large as the profits obtained in the absence of a voluntary agreement.
Several possible motivations for voluntary abatement have been considered in the literature.
One motive is based on the assumption that voluntary abatement is less costly than a mandatory
alternative. Therefore, in the presence of a credible regulatory threat, firms may voluntarily abate
emissions if they are able to ward off future, costly regulation (Segerson and Miceli (1998)). The
assumption that voluntary agreements are less costly is based on the notion that voluntary agree-
ments provide greater flexibility in the methods used to reduce emissions. However, Segerson and
Miceli (2008) note that the cost advantage of voluntary agreements occurs primarily because of
asymmetric information between the firm(s) and regulator. Improvements in the quality of infor-
mation available to the regulator erodes the flexibility advantage of voluntary agreements. Dawson
and Segerson (2008) use credible regulatory threats in a model with an industry-wide abatement
target to analyze the potential for some firms to free-ride on the abatement of others. Their re-
sults show that firms always have an incentive to free-ride, however a voluntary agreement can still
achieve an optimal level of abatement in the presence of a credible regulatory threat.1 While all
firms prefer not to abate, equilibrium requires that some firms abate in spite of the non-abatement
of other firms, in order to avoid the loss in profits that occurs under regulation when the industry
does not meet the target. This result relies on the presence and credibility of a regulatory threat.
Another motive for firm participation is the market based motive which does not rely on a cred-
ible regulatory threat. Firms that voluntarily abate are able to participate in the green market, and
receive a higher price for environmentally friendly products because consumers individually value
environmental quality and are willing to pay a higher price, ceteris paribus, for environmentally
friendly goods. This incentive was studied by Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), who assumed a
duopoly in which firms first choose their level of emissions and then compete over the price charged
in the market. While all consumers in their model have identical preferences for environmentally
friendly products, differences in income lead to different quantities of abatement demanded. Hence,
one firm chooses to abate a relatively large amount of emissions to capture the group of con-
sumers with the highest income. The other firm will choose a relatively low level of abatement and
1However, the voluntary agreement does not necessarily provide the optimal level of abatement at least cost.
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cater to consumers with relatively low income.2 An interesting implication is that regulating the
low-abatement firm causes the high-abatement firm to increase its abatement in order to further
differentiate its product.
Following Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), we assume consumers are willing to pay for envi-
ronmental quality. We depart from the notion that firms are coerced into a voluntary agreement
in reaction to a regulatory threat and assume that the marginal costs of mandatory and volun-
tary abatement are the same. In our model, (some) firms voluntarily abate emissions in order to
differentiate their products as being environmentally friendly and participate in the green market.
Specifically, we assume firms that voluntarily abate receive a higher price than firms that choose not
to abate, and thus firms with low marginal costs of abatement find it profitable to reduce emissions.
However, we depart from Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) by abandoning the duopoly model in
order to provide a general framework for analyzing market-induced abatement. Using a partial
equilibrium analysis to focus on the firms’ problem, we model the participation decision of firms,
as well as the change in profits following mandatory abatement for firms that voluntarily abate
and firms that do not. We compare the mandatory abatement policy in the presence of voluntary
abatement to a traditional mandatory policy in which the regulator does not account for green
market reactions when choosing the level of mandatory abatement. Differences in consumer income
levels in the green market relative to consumer income levels in the brown market identify which
conditions most likely result following regulation, and can provide rules of thumb for regulators in
choosing the level of regulation in the presence of a green market.
Our model makes four contributions to the existing literature. First, we show that mandatory
regulation may crowd out voluntary abatement from green firms. This is contrary to the findings
of Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995); our model identifies the result from Arora and Gangopadhyay
(1995) as a special case. The intuition for our result stems from the idea that consumers are indif-
ferent between the benefits of environmental quality from mandated abatement and from voluntary
abatement. If the regulator imposes a mandatory abatement level on firms that do not voluntarily
abate, total environmental quality will increase, ceteris paribus, and consumers will be less willing
to pay for voluntary abatement from green firms. If the marginal markup that firms command
through voluntary abatement declines, firms will reduce their optimal level of voluntary abatement.
Our second contribution is that we identify the case under which firms individually choose not
to abate, but support a mandatory abatement policy if it implies a sufficiently large increase in the
price received by the firm, resulting in an increase in profits. This result seems counterintuitive.
However, if consumers are willing to pay a higher price for green products, mandatory abatement
results in an increase in demand in the competitive market at every quantity.3 This increase in
demand guarantees an increase in the competitive market price received by the firm, and makes it
possible for firm profits to increase following mandatory abatement.
Third, we show that the relation between the level of mandatory abatement from traditional
2The lowest income group chooses not to purchase any level of abatement.
3Traditional models do not assume consumers are willing to pay more for abatement; thus the demand curve for
the commodity good does not shift following regulation.
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regulatory policies that ignore the effects of regulation in the green market and the level of regulation
when accounting for changes in the green market depends on the relative magnitudes of the change
in environmental quality and firm profitability. We identify conditions under which traditional
regulatory policies over-regulate firms that do not voluntarily abate, when mandatory abatement
both crowds out and does not crowd out voluntary abatement. Our results are appealing because
if the green market reaction to mandatory abatement is large, we expect traditional regulation to
over- (or under-) regulate firms that do not voluntarily abate.
Fourth, we show that the relative income disparity between both markets (the market with
voluntary abatement and without) can identify which of the cases presented in the paper most
likely occur. Policy-makers can use this relative income disparity as a rough guide in determining
the likely reaction to mandatory abatement from the green market. Traditional regulatory policies
likely over-regulate firms that do not voluntarily abate when the relative income disparity is large.
In this case, total environmental quality is likely to be relatively high. Conversely, when the relative
income disparity is small, it is not clear as to whether traditional policies over-regulate. It is clear,
however, that regulation crowds out voluntary abatement resulting in relatively low environmental
quality, possibly even lower than in the absence of regulation. In this case, when the income dis-
parity is relatively low, mandatory abatement may potentially be rendered ineffective at improving
environmental quality.
2 Model Structure
2.1 Basic Assumptions
We assume there are two separate markets for a single consumption good, the competitive market
and the green market. The consumption good is identical in every respect, except for the level of
abatement used during the production of the good. This assumption follows from Arora and Gan-
gopadhyay (1995), and allows for product differentiation based solely on environmental attributes.
The competitive market is characterized by the absence of voluntary abatement, that is, abate-
ment only occurs under mandatory regulation.4 We label the firms in this market the brown firms.
The green market is characterized by the presence of voluntary abatement, i.e., abatement that
exceeds minimum regulatory requirements or abatement in the absence of regulation. We refer to
the firms in the green market as green firms. We assume all firms are identical to the other firms
of the same type (i.e., brown or green), and denote the brown firms with B and green firms with
G. We focus on the case in which the level of mandatory abatement is always below the optimal
level of voluntary abatement. Hence, green firms are green regardless of the level of mandatory
abatement.5
The difference between brown and green firms is embodied in the cost structure for each type.
4We assume throughout the paper that all firms (at least) comply with minimum legal requirements. See Foster
and Gutie´rrez (2009) for a model involving firms that (potentially) violate environmental law.
5One possible extension of the model is to allow the level of regulation to be binding for both the brown and the
originally green firms.
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While all firms face increasing marginal costs of abatement, brown firms have higher marginal costs
of abatement than green firms. Hence, brown firms require a higher price than green firms in order
to voluntarily abate emissions. We assume the cost of abatement borne by each firm is the loss
in profits from a reduction in output; abatement requires investment of productive inputs away
from production of the commodity good and towards abatement of emissions (Cropper and Oates
(1992)).
Following Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), we assume consumers have a positive but diminish-
ing marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality (positive abatement). This assumption
implies that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for a good that is more environmentally
friendly, ceteris paribus.6 Thus, green firms are able to charge a markup above the competitive
market price, depending on the level of abatement. The green market markup is a reward for any
firm that chooses to voluntarily reduce its emissions. We develop the competitive market price and
green market markup in the following two sections.
2.2 The Competitive Market Price
Firms that do not voluntarily abate are not able to differentiate their product as being green, and
are unable to influence the price they receive in the market. These firms operate in the competitive
market and receive the exogenous (to the firm) competitive market price. Our assumption that
consumers are willing to pay a higher price for a green product, ceteris paribus, allows for an
increase in the quantity demanded at every price following regulation. Hence the firm receives a
higher price following regulation.7 The increase in price covers part of the loss in profits from an
increase in production costs.
The adjustment in the competitive market price is not the same as the green market markup.
Brown firms are still bound by the regulation and are unable to individually influence the price
through their abatement. Thus the adjustment in the competitive market price is not a reward for
product differentiation. We denote the competitive market price, the total price received by the
brown firm, as P (z¯), in which ∂P (z¯)/∂z¯ ≥ 0, for some mandatory abatement level, z¯ ≥ 0. For the
following analysis, we assume this derivative is strictly positive.
2.3 The Markup
We assume firms operating in the green market are able to exercise some control over the price they
receive through their ability to differentiate their product. Our assumption that consumers have
6Elfenbein and McManus (2010) provide empirical evidence that consumers are willing to pay a higher price for
environmentally friendly goods, among other private goods that provide public benefits.
7Traditional models (e.g., Cropper and Oates (1990)) assume the equilibrium market price rises following regulation
(e.g., a Pigouvian tax). However, from the perspective of the individual firm, the effect of the tax can be interpreted
as an increase in marginal cost, while the equilibrium price received does not change. The magnitude of the increase
in marginal cost depends on the share of the tax burden borne by the firm. For any given demand curve, we can
identify a shift in the marginal cost such that the equilibrium price received by the firm does not change following
regulation. Thus the increase in the competitive market price in our model occurs solely from a shift in the demand
curve.
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a positive but diminishing marginal willingness to pay for a good that is environmentally friendly,
ceteris paribus, implies that the markup available to a green firm is increasing at a decreasing rate
with the abatement employed by the firm. Hence, the markup is a function of the firm’s own level
of abatement.
The markup also depends on the aggregate level of environmental quality, which depends on the
level of mandatory abatement. Mandatory abatement creates a minimum level of environmental
quality; an increase in the level of mandatory abatement implies an increase in environmental quality,
ceteris paribus. If consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for abatement is decreasing as abatement
increases, an increase in environmental quality decreases the amount consumers are willing to pay
for voluntary abatement. Thus, consumers are willing to pay a higher price for a given level of
voluntary abatement in the absence of mandatory abatement than in the presence of mandatory
abatement. Mandated abatement increases the aggregate level of environmental quality and reduces
the amount consumers are willing to pay for voluntary abatement. Therefore, the markup depends
on the level of mandatory abatement; an increase in the level of mandated abatement decreases the
markup.
The preceding argument also implies a reduction in the marginal markup following manda-
tory abatement. Because mandatory abatement increases aggregate environmental quality, ceteris
paribus, consumers are less willing to pay for marginal abatement. Hence, in addition to decreasing
the level of the markup, mandatory abatement decreases the marginal markup. We denote the
markup as Ω(zi, z¯), in which zi is the abatement undertaken by the i
th firm, and z¯ is the mandated
level of abatement.
Figure 1 shows the markup for a given level of mandatory regulation as a function of the firm’s
level of abatement. The figure illustrates several features of the model. First, in the absence of
regulation, z¯ = 0, green firms will obtain a markup, Ω(zi, z¯), for any amount of abatement. This
markup corresponds to Ωz¯0 in Figure 1. Second, as a green firm increases its abatement, the total
markup increases, but the marginal markup decreases. Third, given a nonzero level of mandatory
abatement8, z¯ > 0, the markup only becomes available to firms that voluntarily abate. The markup
is zero for firms that abate the mandated level. In addition, the total and marginal markup for any
given level of abatement is lower than in the absence of regulation, or for a lower level of mandated
abatement.
Consider, for example, an initial level of voluntary abatement zi = 2, shown by the dotted line
in Figure 1. In the absence of mandatory abatement, the markup is given by Ωz¯0(zi = 2), shown
by point A in the figure. If the regulator imposes a mandatory abatement level z¯ = 1, the markup
is given by Ωz¯1(zi = 2), shown by point B. At this new markup, the total and marginal markup
have decreased. The firm’s voluntary level of abatement is less differentiated from the competitive
market because the firm abates only one unit above the mandatory level instead of two units above
the mandatory level as it had prior to regulation. Thus, the total markup decreases. Since demand
for abatement is positive but diminishing, consumers are less willing to pay for marginal increases
8In Figure 1, the mandatory abatement level is increasing with the subscript on z¯, so that z¯i+1 > z¯i for all
i = 0, . . . , 2 and z¯0 = 0.
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Figure 1: The green market markup, Ω(zi, z¯).
in abatement following the regulation. Hence the marginal markup falls; the slope of the markup
function at B is less than at A.
The above discussion demonstrates that the standard assumption of positive but diminish-
ing marginal willingness to pay (for abatement) has powerful implications regarding the markup
obtained by green firms. In the absence of mandatory regulation, small amounts of abatement
command a high marginal markup because consumers are unable to otherwise obtain improvements
in environmental quality. As environmental quality improves through mandated abatement, con-
sumers are less willing to pay a premium for voluntary abatement. If consumers are indifferent
between the benefits from mandated abatement or voluntary abatement, mandatory abatement
reduces the reward for firms that voluntarily abate.
We formalize the previous discussion by defining the following derivatives: ∂Ω(·)/∂zi > 0 and
∂2Ω(·)/∂z2i < 0, while ∂Ω(·)/∂z¯ < 0 and ∂
2Ω(·)/∂z¯∂zi < 0. The first two derivatives refer to the
positive and diminishing marginal markup as the firm increases its abatement, ceteris paribus. These
derivatives capture the extent to which the firm can control the green market price; ∂Ω(·)/∂zi is the
marginal markup available to the firm and ∂2Ω(·)/∂z2i is the rate at which the marginal markup
decreases as abatement increases. The third derivative refers to the decrease in the firm’s ability to
differentiate its product because of an increase in mandatory abatement. The last derivative refers
to the reduction in the marginal markup because of the increase in mandatory abatement. The last
two derivatives capture the changes in the markup that the green firm cannot control.
Combining the competitive market price with the markup gives the total price received in the
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green market: [P (z¯) + Ω(zi, z¯)].
3 The Firm’s Problem
We assume each firm has a production function, fi(zi), in which the only (negative) input is abate-
ment.9 Since the cost of abatement borne by the firm is a loss in profits from a reduction in
output, and the marginal cost of abatement is positive and increasing, increases in abatement lead
to marginally greater losses in output. Therefore, f ′i(zi) < 0 and f
′′
i (zi) < 0. The brown firm,
denoted with subscript B, faces higher marginal costs of abatement for any given level of abatement
than the green firm, denoted with subscript G, so that |f ′B(zB)| > |f
′
G(zG)| > 0, for all zB and zG.
The benefit to the firm from abatement is the increase in price obtained from the markup. The
markup is available to all firms, should they choose to voluntarily abate; all firms face the same
profit maximizing problem, namely, choosing their optimal level of abatement. We arbitrarily set
the initial level of mandatory abatement to zero, z¯ = 0, but it could also be some positive level
without changing the resulting analysis.
The firm’s problem is to maximize profits, pii(zi), by choosing its optimal level of abatement,
z∗i , given the level of mandatory abatement, z¯.
max
zi
pii(zi|z¯) = fi(zi)[P (z¯) + Ω(zi, z¯)]. (1)
Taking the derivative of equation (1) with respect to zi yields the first order condition
∂pii(zi|z¯)
∂zi
=
∂fi(zi)
∂zi
[P (z¯) + Ω(zi, z¯)] + fi(zi)
∂Ω(zi, z¯)
∂zi
≤ 0. (2)
Equation (2) is made up of two components. The first term is the marginal cost of abatement:
the value of the loss in output from a marginal increase in abatement. The second term is the
marginal benefit of abatement: the revenue earned from the increase in the markup obtained from
a marginal increase in abatement. Rearranging equation (2) yields a trade-off between the marginal
cost and marginal benefit of abatement facing each firm:
−
∂fi(zi)
∂zi
[P (z¯) + Ω(zi, z¯)] ≥ fi(zi)
∂Ω(zi, z¯)
∂zi
. (3)
The brown firm, by definition, faces a higher marginal cost of abatement, such that the costs
outweigh the benefits for each marginal unit of abatement. Hence, brown firms choose the corner
solution, z∗B = 0. In this case, the inequality in equation (2) is strictly negative, meaning that any
abatement undertaken by a brown firm leads to a loss in profits. Letting z¯ = 0, brown firm profits
are given by fB(0)P (0).
10
The green firm, because of a lower marginal cost of abatement, chooses the interior solution,
9Dawson and Segerson (2008) make a similar assumption by allowing production to be a function only of emissions.
10The markup drops out of the profit equation since Ω(zi, z¯) = 0 whenever zi = 0.
8
z∗G > 0, by equating the marginal cost of abatement with the marginal benefit. The benefit from
obtaining the markup is enough to offset the cost of the reduction in output for some level of
abatement, therefore the firm voluntarily abates. Green profits, assuming initial regulation is zero,
is given by fG(z
∗
G)[P (0) + Ω(z
∗
G, 0)].
In general, initial mandatory abatement need not equal zero. Therefore, optimal firm profits
can be summarized by the following equation:
pii(z
∗
i |z¯) =
{
fi(z
∗
i )P (z¯) if z
∗
i = z¯
fi(z
∗
i )[P (z¯) + Ω(z
∗
i , z¯)] if z
∗
i > z¯
(4)
4 The Relation Between Mandatory And Voluntary Abatement
By definition, green firms are not subject to the mandatory level of abatement. However, regulation
effectively changes the extent to which the green firm can differentiate its product. Because of a
reduction in the total and marginal markup, the optimal level of abatement for the green firm
changes.
Since the optimal level of abatement, z∗G, solves equation (2) with strict equality, we must analyze
the change in z∗G from regulation while requiring equation (2) to equal zero. Letting pi
′
G(zG|z¯) denote
the marginal profit condition in equation (2), the change in optimal abatement following regulation
is
∂pi′G(z
∗
G|z¯)
∂z∗G
dz∗G +
∂pi′G(z
∗
G|z¯)
∂z¯
dz¯ = 0. (5)
Thus, the change in voluntary abatement is
dz∗G
dz¯
= −
∂pi′G(z
∗
G|z¯)/∂z¯
∂pi′G(z
∗
G|z¯)/∂zG
R 0, (6)
which is equivalent to
dz∗G
dz¯
= −
∂fG(z
∗
G)
∂z∗
G
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G,z¯)
∂z¯
]
+ fG(z
∗
G)
∂2Ω(z∗G,z¯)
∂z¯∂z∗
G
∂2fG(z
∗
G
)
∂z∗2
G
[P (z¯) + Ω(z∗G, z¯)] + 2
∂fG(z
∗
G
)
∂z∗
G
∂Ω(z∗
G
,z¯)
∂z∗
G
+ fG(z∗G)
∂2Ω(z∗
G
,z¯)
∂z∗2
G
R 0. (7)
Since the marginal cost of abatement is increasing at an increasing rate, and the markup is
increasing at a decreasing rate with respect to abatement, the denominator is unambiguously neg-
ative. The negative denominator and the negative sign in front of equation (7) ensures that the
direction of the change in voluntary abatement is the same as the sign of the numerator. The
direction of the change in optimal abatement for the green firm depends on the change in marginal
profits with respect to the increase in mandatory abatement, ceteris paribus.
The numerator of equation (7) can be broken down into two components: the change in the
marginal abatement cost, ∂fG(zG)
∂zG
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+ ∂Ω(zG,z¯)
∂z¯
]
, and the change in the marginal benefit of
abatement, fG(zG)
∂2Ω(zG,z¯)
∂z¯∂zG
. Both changes occur because of regulation. The change in the marginal
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cost of abatement depends on the relative magnitudes of the increase in the competitive market price
and the decrease in the total markup. The change in the marginal benefit of abatement is always
negative. The direction of the change in optimal abatement depends on the relative magnitudes of
the changes in the marginal cost and marginal benefit from abatement.
Proposition 1. The green firm decreases its abatement following regulation if:
1. the increase in the competitive market price is greater than the decrease in the green market
markup, or
2. the increase in the competitive market price is less than the decrease in the markup, and the
marginal markup decreases sufficiently.
Conversely, the green firm increases its abatement following regulation if the increase in the com-
petitive market price is less than the decrease in the markup, and the marginal markup does not
decrease sufficiently.
Proof. If the increase in the competitive market price is greater than the decrease in the markup,
then
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+ ∂Ω(zG,z¯)
∂z¯
]
> 0. Thus, the numerator in equation (7) is negative, and the green firm
reduces its abatement. This establishes the first part of the proposition.
If the decrease in the markup is greater than the increase in the competitive price, then[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+ ∂Ω(zG,z¯)
∂z¯
]
< 0. In this case, the sign of the numerator in equation (7) depends on the
relative magnitudes of the first and second terms. If the decline in the marginal markup is suffi-
ciently large, such that the second term in the numerator dominates the first, the green firm reduces
its abatement. This establishes the second part of the proposition.
The third part of the proposition is similar to the second part because
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+ ∂Ω(zG,z¯)
∂z¯
]
< 0.
Hence, the sign of the numerator in equation (7) depends on the relative magnitudes of the first
and second terms. However, if the decline in the marginal markup is small enough, and the first
term in the numerator dominates the second, equation (7) will be positive. Thus the green firm
increases its abatement. This establishes the third part of the proposition.
The intuition behind the first part of Proposition 1 is that the marginal cost of a given level of
abatement is increasing with the price received by the firm. As the price rises, the value of forgone
profits (from the reduction in output) increases. Hence the marginal cost of abatement increases. In
this case, the increase in the competitive market price is greater than the decrease in the markup,
so the total price received by the firm increases. Since the marginal cost of abatement increases and
the marginal benefit of abatement declines, the firm decreases its abatement.
The second part of Proposition 1 begins with a decrease in the price received because the
increase in the competitive market price is less than the decrease in the markup. The decrease
in price implies that the marginal cost of abatement decreases. When the marginal markup falls
sufficiently, so that the decrease in the marginal benefit of abatement outweighs the decrease in the
marginal cost, the green firm reduces its abatement. However, the last part of Proposition 1 shows
that the green firm increases its abatement if the reduction in the marginal benefit of abatement is
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small, relative to the decrease in the marginal cost. If consumers are willing to pay a relatively high
marginal markup for voluntary abatement following regulation, i.e. the marginal markup does not
decrease sufficiently, the green firm may still find it profitable to further differentiate its product
through further abatement.
The cases in which the green firm decreases its abatement following regulation imply that reg-
ulation crowds out voluntary abatement. This scenario may arise if consumers’ willingness to pay
for abatement is relatively low, and is sensitive to the level of mandated abatement. The third case,
in which the green firm seeks further product differentiation following mandated abatement, relies
critically on a relatively small change in consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for abatement. This
condition implies a relatively large and inelastic demand for abatement, and is the case studied by
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995).
5 The Change In Optimal Profits Following Mandatory Abate-
ment
We now determine the change in optimal profits for both the brown and green firms following
regulation. The brown firm adopts the new level of mandatory abatement, and the green firm shifts
from the initially optimal level of abatement to the subsequently optimal level of abatement.
5.1 The Change In Optimal Profits For The Brown Firm
The brown firm does not obtain the markup either before or after regulation, and is subject to the
mandated level of abatement, z¯. Thus, brown profits are pi∗B(z¯) = fB(z¯)P (z¯). The change in profits
is
∂pi∗B(z¯)
∂z¯
=
∂fB(z¯)
∂z¯
P (z¯) + fB(z¯)
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
R 0. (8)
For any z¯ > 0, ∂fB(z¯)/∂z¯ < 0, since the quantity produced is decreasing in the level of abate-
ment. However, since ∂P (z¯)/∂z¯ > 0, the change in brown profits following regulation depends on
the decrease in output and the increase in the competitive price. The increase in the price increases
profits, while the decrease in output decreases profits, ceteris paribus.
Proposition 2. The brown firm’s profits increase following regulation if the increase in profits from
an increase in the competitive market price is sufficiently large to offset the decline in profits from
a reduction in output produced.
Proof. The first term in equation (8) is negative, and the second term is positive. Hence, the sign
of equation (8) depends on the relative magnitudes of the first and second terms. The first term
represents the decrease in profits from a reduction in output, valued at pre-regulation prices. The
second term is the increase in profits from an increase in the competitive market price following
regulation. Thus, when the increase in profits from an increase in the competitive market price is
greater than the decrease in profits from a reduction in output, brown profits rise.
11
Figure 2 illustrates the intuition for Proposition 2.11 The firm initially receives a price of P (0)
for fB(0) units produced. Profits are given by the area P (0)× fB(0). When z¯ is imposed, the firm
loses P (0) on each unit it no longer produces, [fB(0) − fB(z¯)]. This area is labeled Loss. Since
the competitive price rises, the firm receives the amount of the price increase, [P (z¯) − P (0)], on
all remaining units, fB(z¯). This area is labeled Gain. Whether profits rise or fall depends on the
relative magnitudes of the gain and loss the firm incurs.
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Figure 2: The relative increase and decrease in profits following regulation for the brown firm.
In the absence of regulation, the only benefit from abatement is the markup. By definition, the
brown firm does not find it profitable to abate and extract the markup. Therefore, there is no private
incentive for the brown firm to abate; no individual brown firm is able to influence the price in the
competitive market. However, it may be collectively better for brown firms to abate if the change in
the competitive market price is sufficiently large such that brown firm profits increase. Regulation
can have precisely this effect. This case is formalized by the following corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. A brown firm is willing to pay the regulator to impose (or not to impose) mandatory
abatement if it leads to an increase (decrease) in profits. The maximum amount a firm is willing
to pay to impose (or not to impose) the regulation is equal to the positive (or negative) change in
profits at that level of mandated abatement.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 2. If the brown firm’s profits rise following regulation,
the firm is willing to pay any amount up to the rise in profits compared to the pre-regulation
11Figure 2 assumes a discrete change in brown profits in order to clearly illustrate the intuition for Proposition 2.
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level to impose the regulation. The converse is true if the brown firm’s profits decrease following
regulation.
Corollary 1 establishes an interesting result: a firm that would individually choose not to abate
may prefer to abate provided that all other competing firms do the same.
5.2 The Change In Optimal Profits For The Green Firm
The change in profits for a green firm is more complicated than for a brown firm, since the green
firm chooses z∗G both in the absence and presence of regulation. However, z
∗
G depends on the level
of mandatory abatement, z¯. Thus, green profits are pi∗G(z¯) = fG(z
∗
G(z¯))[P (z¯) + Ω(z
∗
G(z¯), z¯)]. The
change in profits for the green firm is
∂pi∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
=
∂fG(z
∗
G(z¯))
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
[P (z¯) + Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)]+
fG(z
∗
G(z¯))
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z¯
]
R 0. (9)
While ∂z¯ > 0 ensures that ∂P (z¯)/∂z¯ > 0, it is not clear whether ∂z∗G(z¯)/∂z¯ is greater or less
than zero. The sign of ∂z∗G(z¯)/∂z¯ depends on whether the green firm increases or decreases its
abatement after the regulation. That is, on whether or not mandatory abatement crowds out
voluntary abatement.
Proposition 3. A green firm’s optimal profits increase following regulation if:
1. the increase in the competitive market price is greater than the decrease in the markup, re-
gardless of the magnitude of crowding out, or
2. the increase in the competitive market price is less than the decrease in the markup and the
crowding out of voluntary abatement is sufficiently large.
Conversely, a green firm’s optimal profits decrease following regulation if:
1. the green firm increases its optimal level of abatement, or
2. the increase in the competitive market price is less than the decrease in the markup and the
crowding out of voluntary abatement is sufficiently small.
Proof. The change in optimal profits for a green firm given in equation (9) consists of two terms:
the first term is the change in profits because of a change in output, valued at the pre-regulation
price received by the firm, and the second term is the change in profits from a change in the price
received. The sign of the first term depends on the direction of the change in abatement from the
green firm following regulation, and the sign of the second term depends on the relative magnitudes
of the increase in the competitive market price and the decrease in the markup.12
12The markup received by the firm always decreases following regulation because the markup is globally concave,
regardless of the change in optimal voluntary abatement. Thus,
∂Ω(z∗
G
(z¯),z¯)
∂z∗
G
(z¯)
∂z∗
G
(z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗
G
(z¯),z¯)
∂z¯
in equation (9) is
always negative.
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Condition 1 in the first part of Proposition 3 states that
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
]
> −
[
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z¯
]
.
This condition implies that the price received by the firm increases:
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z¯
]
> 0.
Proposition 1 shows that in this case the green firm decreases its abatement following regulation,
∂z∗G(z¯)/∂z¯ < 0. Thus the quantity produced of the commodity good increases: ∂fG(z
∗
G(z¯))/∂z
∗
G(z¯) >
0. Therefore, equation (9) is positive, and green profits increase. This establishes Condition 1 in
the first part of Proposition 3.
Condition 2 in the first and second parts of Proposition 3 state that
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
]
< −
[
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z¯
]
.
Therefore, the price received by the firm decreases
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z¯
]
< 0.
In addition, both Conditions 2 state that mandatory abatement crowds out voluntary abatement:
optimal abatement decreases, ∂z∗G(z¯)/∂z¯ < 0, and output increases ∂fG(z
∗
G(z¯))/∂z
∗
G(z¯) > 0. There-
fore the first term in equation (9) is positive and the second term is negative. The sign of equation (9)
depends on the relative magnitudes of the first and second terms. If the crowding out is sufficiently
large, the decrease in voluntary abatement is sufficient so that the first term dominates the second in
equation (9). In this case, equation (9) is positive and profits rise. If the crowding out is sufficiently
small, the decrease in voluntary abatement is small and the second term in equation (9) dominates
the first. In this case, equation (9) is negative, and profits fall. This establishes Condition 2 in the
first and second parts of Proposition 3.
Condition 1 in the second part of Proposition 3 states that ∂z∗G(z¯)/∂z¯ > 0. Thus the quantity
produced decreases: ∂fG(z
∗
G(z¯))/∂z
∗
G(z¯) < 0. Proposition 1 shows that in this case the rise in the
competitive market price is less than the decrease in the markup:
[
∂P (z¯)
∂z¯
]
< −
[
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z∗G(z¯)
∂z¯
+
∂Ω(z∗G(z¯), z¯)
∂z¯
]
.
Therefore, equation (9) is negative, and profits decrease. This establishes Condition 1 in the second
part of Proposition 3 and completes the proof.
The intuition for Condition 1 in the first part of Proposition 3 is straightforward; both the price
received and the quantity produced by the firm increase, so profits increase. Condition 1 of the
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second part of Proposition 3 deals with the opposite case, in which both the price received and the
quantity produced decrease, so profits decrease.
The intuition for Condition 2 in both the first and second parts of Proposition 3 is similar to
the intuition for Proposition 2, and is shown Figure 1. The decrease in output decreases firm profits
while the increase in the price received increases profits, ceteris paribus. The relative magnitudes
of these effects determines the change in optimal profits for a green firm.
5.3 Discussion
This section established conditions under which firm profits increase or decrease following regulation.
It is not clear a priori which case will result following regulation. One lesson that arises through
the cases presented so far is that with the exception of the final part of Proposition 1, the green
firm reduces its optimal level of abatement following regulation. Typically, mandatory regulation
is assumed to increase environmental quality, regardless of the loss in profits realized by the firm.
However, this model shows that in the presence of a green market, the incentive for the green firm
to reduce its abatement may dampen the effects of the regulation. In the perverse case, in which the
reduction in voluntary abatement exceeds the mandated level of abatement, regulation may reduce
aggregate environmental quality.
6 The Change In Total Environmental Quality
We now turn to the change in total environmental quality following regulation. Let z∗G1 denote the
pre-regulation level of voluntary abatement, and z∗G2 the post-regulation level. In the absence of
regulation, environmental quality is determined by z∗G1 , since only the green firm undertakes any
abatement. Following regulation, total environmental quality is given by z¯+z∗G2 : abatement from the
brown firm meeting the mandatory level of abatement and the new optimal level of abatement from
the green firm.13 Thus, the net change in environmental quality following regulation is z¯+ ∂z∗G/∂z¯.
Proposition 4. Total environmental quality increases following regulation if voluntary abatement
by the green firm is not crowded out by mandatory abatement by the brown firm.
Proof. If the green firm increases its abatement following regulation, then ∂z∗G/∂z¯ > 0. Total
environmental quality necessarily improves since both the brown and green firm increase their
abatement.
In this case, the green market acts to amplify the effect of regulation. This case may arise in an
area in which there is a strong and differentiated green market. Consumers in the green market are
not particularly sensitive to mandatory abatement in the competitive market and are still willing
to pay a relatively large markup for additional abatement in spite of the increase in environmental
quality from regulation.
13This representation for total environmental quality assumes only one brown firm and one green firm.
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If mandatory abatement crowds out voluntary abatement, but the green firm reduces its abate-
ment by less than the regulated amount, environmental quality will still increase, but the reduction
in green market abatement dampens the effect of regulation. In the extreme case, environmental
quality declines relative to the pre-regulation level if the green firm decreases its abatement by more
than the level of mandated abatement. This case may arise if consumers are sensitive to change in
environmental quality, so that given an improvement in environmental quality from regulation the
marginal markup for the green firm decreases substantially.
7 Regulation
7.1 Do Not Ignore The Green Market
The reaction of voluntary abatement to mandated abatement makes the resulting level of environ-
mental quality ambiguous. Consider the case in which the regulator’s goal is to obtain the level of
environmental quality associated with some target level of abatement, z˜. In the absence of a green
market, the regulator sets the mandated level of abatement equal to the target level: z¯ = z˜. The
previous section shows that in the presence of a green market, setting the mandated level of abate-
ment equal to the target level does not achieve the target level of environmental quality. Therefore,
the regulator must consider the reaction in the green market when setting the level of mandatory
abatement.
When the firm chooses its optimal abatement, it compares its private costs (the loss in output)
to its private gain (the increase in price received). The regulator, however, also accounts for the
external benefits from abatement, namely, the change in environmental quality. We compare the
level of mandated abatement from traditional regulatory policy to the level from regulation in the
presence of a green market. Traditionally, there is no green market or increase in the competitive
market price. The only benefit of regulation is the improvement in environmental quality. This is
the benchmark case because traditionally regulation is assumed to improve environmental quality
by forcing brown firms to abate emissions, regardless of the associated loss in profits.
7.2 Traditional Regulation
Traditionally, the regulator only considers the competitive market when setting the level of manda-
tory abatement, and assumes the competitive market price is constant at P¯ = P (0). Thus, he only
considers the value of the change in environmental quality, v(zB), and the loss in competitive market
value from a reduction in output as the competitive firm adopts the mandated level of abatement.
In this case, the regulator faces the problem:
max
zB
v(zB) + fB(zB)P¯ . (10)
This problem yields the following first order condition:
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∂v(zB)
∂zB
+
∂fB(zB)
∂zB
P¯ = 0, (11)
or
∂v(zB)
∂zB
= −
∂fB(zB)
∂zB
P¯ . (12)
Thus, in the traditional case the regulator chooses the level of mandatory abatement, z¯ = z∗BT , where
the marginal benefits of regulation, namely the value of a marginal improvement in environmental
quality, is equal to the marginal cost of regulation, namely the loss in competitive market profits
that occurs because of a reduction in output.
7.3 Regulation In The Presence Of A Green Market
7.3.1 The Regulator’s Problem
Now consider the case in which some firms operate in the competitive market and others in the green
market. As in the traditional case, the regulator directly determines abatement in the competitive
market. However, because voluntary abatement is a function of the competitive market level of
abatement, the regulator must account for changes in the green market when setting mandatory
abatement. The regulator’s problem is:
max
zB
v(zB, zG(zB)) + fB(zB)P (zB) + fG(zG(zB))[P (zB) + Ω(zG(zB), zB)]. (13)
The first order condition is
∂v(zB, zG(zB))
∂zB
+
∂v(zB, zG(zB))
∂zG(zB)
∂zG(zB)
∂zB
+
∂fB(zB)
∂zB
P (zB) + fB(zB)
∂P (zB)
∂zB
+
∂fG(zG(zB))
∂zG
∂zG(zB)
∂zB
[P (zB) + Ω(zG(zB), zB)]
+ fG(zG(zB))
[
∂P (zB)
∂zB
+
∂Ω(zG(zB), zB)
∂zG
∂zG(zB)
∂zB
+
∂Ω(zG(zB), zB)
∂zB
]
= 0. (14)
Equating the marginal social benefits with the marginal social costs,14 equation (14) becomes
∂v(zB, zG(zB))
∂zB
+
∂v(zB, zG(zB))
∂zG(zB)
∂zG(zB)
∂zB
=
−
∂fB(zB)
∂zB
P (zB)− fB(zB)
∂P (zB)
∂zB
−
∂fG(zG(zB))
∂zG
∂zG(zB)
∂zB
[P (zB) + Ω(zG(zB), zB)]
− fG(zG(zB))
[
∂P (zB)
∂zB
+
∂Ω(zG(zB), zB)
∂zG
∂zG(zB)
∂zB
+
∂Ω(zG(zB), zB)
∂zB
]
. (15)
The marginal social benefit on the left-hand side of equation (15) is the value of the change in
14Our use of the term ‘social’ acknowledges that the regulator considers the changes in environmental quality when
setting the level of mandatory abatement which are not considered by firms in the private problem.
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environmental quality following regulation. The marginal social cost of regulation, on the right-
hand side of equation (15) is made up of two parts: the change in competitive market profits and
the change in green market profits. The first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (15)
reflect the change in competitive market profits; the last two terms reflect the change in green
market profits. The marginal social cost from the change in competitive market profits is smaller
in equation (15) than in equation (12) because in equation (15) the regulator takes into account
the increase in profits from an increase in the competitive market price following regulation. The
solution to equation (15), z¯ = z∗BGM , depends on the reaction of voluntary abatement to regulation.
We consider both cases in which there is no crowding out and crowding out of voluntary abatement
following regulation.
7.3.2 Regulation Without Crowding Out
From Propositions 1 and 3, when the green firm increases its abatement following regulation, profits
fall. Thus, the net change in profits for the green market in equation (15) is negative. This implies a
net increase in the marginal social cost of regulation, compared to the traditional regulation model.
The marginal social benefit of regulation in equation (15), compared to equation (12), is larger by
the increase in environmental quality from green firms.
Thus, a trade-off between the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost of regulation
determines the level of mandatory abatement in the presence of a green market and its relation to
mandatory abatement in the traditional case, z∗BT . The marginal social benefit is the improvement
in environmental quality from further voluntary abatement from the green firm; the marginal social
cost is the net decrease in green profits plus the net change in brown profits. When the value of the
increase in the environmental quality is larger than the decrease in green profits plus the net change
in brown profits, mandatory abatement in the presence of a green market is larger than traditional
mandatory abatement, z∗BGM > z
∗
BT
. Otherwise, mandatory abatement in the presence of a green
market is at most as large as traditional mandatory abatement, z∗BGM ≤ z
∗
BT
.
7.3.3 Regulation With Crowding Out
Now consider the case in which regulation crowds out voluntary abatement; two different cases
arise. In one case, green profits rise; in the other case the change in green profits depends on the
relative strengths of two different terms: the loss in profits from a reduction in output, and the gain
in profits from a higher price received by the firm.
Consider first the case in which green profits increase and the net change in green profits on
the right-hand side of equation (15) is positive. The marginal social cost in equation (15) decreases
relative to marginal social cost in equation (12) by the net increase in green profits, for a given
change in brown profits. The marginal social benefit in equation (15) decreases by the value of
the decrease in environmental quality from green firms. Thus, there is a trade-off between the
net increase in profits in the green market, the net change in competitive market profits, and the
decrease in voluntary abatement. This trade-off determines the relationship between the level of
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mandatory abatement in the presence of a green market and the level of abatement under traditional
regulatory policies. If the sum of the net increase in green profits and the increase in competitive
market profits exceeds the value of the decrease in environmental quality, z∗BGM > z
∗
BT
, otherwise
z∗BGM < z
∗
BT
.
Now consider the case in which the change in green profits is ambiguous. There again exists
a trade-off between the net change in green market profits, the decrease in environmental quality
from green firms, and the net change in competitive market profits.
Proposition 5. Traditional regulation over-regulates the competitive market, compared to regulation
in the presence of a green market, if
1. in the no crowding out case, the loss in green market profits is greater than the sum of the
value of the increase in environmental quality in the green market and the increase in profits
in the competitive market from an increase in the competitive market price, or
2. in the crowding out case, the value of the loss in environmental quality in the green market
is greater than the net increase in profits in the green market and the increase in competitive
market profits from an increase in the competitive market price.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the above discussion.
The intuition for Proposition 5 is straightforward. If the regulator does not consider consumers’
green preferences, he fails to take into account the net change in brown firm profits, the net change
in green firm profits, and the reaction of voluntary abatement to mandatory abatement. Therefore
the marginal social benefit and marginal social cost in the traditional model are not accurate. The
relative magnitudes of the changes in brown firm profitability, green market profits, and voluntary
abatement determine the relationship between traditional regulation and regulation in the presence
of a green market. The level of mandatory abatement in the presence of a green market can be
either higher or lower than the traditional regulation level.
8 Consumer Income In The Green Market
Thus far, we have presented a general framework for analyzing the firm’s decision to voluntarily
abate emissions in the face of a green market markup, as well as firm profitability in the presence
of regulation. We have compared the regulatory policy that accounts for green preferences with
the traditional policy, and have identified cases under which traditional regulation may over- or
under-regulate the competitive market. We now address the conditions under which each of the
cases most likely occurs.
8.1 Consumer Income And The Green Market Markup
Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) state that high income consumers have a higher marginal willing-
ness to pay for abatement than low income consumers, since their opportunity cost of consuming
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abatement is lower. Wealthier consumers must forgo less consumption (of the composite commod-
ity, for example) in order to consume abatement. The markup in the green market depends, by
definition, on consumers’ total and marginal willingness to pay for abatement. Following the intu-
ition in Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), we make the following claims regarding the markup and
the changes in the total and marginal markup following regulation.
First, a green market with relatively high income consumers is likely to have a higher total
and marginal markup for any given level of abatement, relative to a green market with relatively
low income consumers, ceteris paribus.15 If high income consumers have a relatively high marginal
willingness to pay for voluntary abatement, green firms are able to extract a relatively higher
markup for a given level of abatement. However, if consumers are less willing to pay for abatement,
green firms extract a relatively lower markup. Furthermore, if the marginal willingness to pay for
abatement is higher for high income consumers relative to low income consumers, green firms obtain
a higher marginal markup in a relatively high income market than in a relatively low income market,
ceteris paribus.
Figure 3 provides an example of the markup extracted by the green firm for high and low
income consumers. The markup with high income consumers is denoted ΩH , and the markup with
low income consumers is ΩL. At any given level of abatement, the high income markup is both
higher and steeper than the low income markup, implying a higher total and marginal markup for
the high income market.
Second, the change in the total markup following regulation is larger in the high income green
market relative to the low income green market. Consider the example shown in Figure 3; by
definition, the markup is available only to firms that voluntarily abate. The markup is unavailable
to any firms that choose to abate the mandated level. When mandated abatement increases, e.g.,
from z¯ = 0 to z¯ = 1 in Figure 3, the markup must equal zero at zi = z¯ = 1, regardless of the
income level of consumers in the green market. Hence, the decrease in the total markup (which is
represented by a downward shift of Ω(·) in the figure) must be large in the high income market,
since it must decrease by an amount equal to ΩA. The markup in the low income market must
decrease by an amount equal to ΩB. Thus the decrease in the markup following regulation must be
larger in the high income green market relative to the low income green market, ceteris paribus.
Third, the change in the marginal markup, following regulation, is smaller in the high income
green market, relative to the low income green market. If high income consumers have a relatively
higher marginal willingness to pay for abatement, their demand for abatement is likely to be less
sensitive to the level of mandatory abatement. Low income consumers, on the other hand, are
sensitive to the level of mandated abatement, since they have a relatively lower marginal willingness
to pay for abatement. Low income consumers are more likely to substitute away from abatement
following regulation.
We, therefore, summarize the effects of regulation on the markup for low and high income
15We assume there exists consumers whose income is sufficiently low such that they participate in the competitive
market. Thus, high and low income consumers refer to the relative level of income of the green market consumers.
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Figure 3: Markup for high income consumers, ΩH , versus low income consumers, ΩL.
consumers as:16
Low Income =


∂Ω(zi, z¯)
∂z¯
≈ 0 Decrease in total markup is relatively small
∂2Ω(zi, z¯)
∂z¯∂zi
< 0 Decrease in marginal markup is relatively large
(16)
High Income =


∂Ω(zi, z¯)
∂z¯
< 0 Decrease in total markup is relatively large
∂2Ω(zi, z¯)
∂z¯∂zi
≈ 0 Decrease in marginal markup is relatively small
(17)
8.2 Using Consumer Income To Identify Changes In Green Market Abatement
The summary in (16) and (17) sheds light on the relative magnitudes of the changes in the total
and marginal markup following regulation. For a given change in the competitive market price,
these changes in the markup determine the change in the optimal levels of abatement and profits
for green firms.
Returning to Proposition 1, green firms increase their abatement following regulation if the
increase in the competitive market price is less than the decrease in the markup, while the marginal
markup does not decrease sufficiently. This is likely to be the case when consumers in the green
16We refer to relatively small partial effects in equations (16) and (17) as being approximately zero to distinguish
them from partial effects that are relatively large in magnitude.
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market are high income consumers, and follows from the changes in the markup for high income
consumers summarized in (17). If the decrease in the total markup is relatively large, it is likely
that it is larger in magnitude than the increase in the competitive market price. Since the decrease
in the marginal markup is relatively small, green firms increase their abatement.
Conversely, crowding out occurs if green market consumers have relatively low income. Proposi-
tion 1 states that regulation crowds out voluntary abatement if either the increase in the competitive
market price is larger than the decrease in the markup, or the decrease in the markup is larger than
the increase in the competitive market price and the decrease in the marginal markup is relatively
large. From (16), it is unclear whether or not the change in the competitive market price is larger
than the decrease in the total markup, since the change in the total markup is small. However,
the change in the marginal markup in equation (16) is relatively large. If the increase in the com-
petitive market price is smaller than the decrease in the markup, green firms reduce their optimal
level of abatement because of the relatively large decrease in the marginal markup. Conversely, if
the increase in the competitive market price is larger than the decrease in the markup, green firms
reduce their abatement regardless of the decrease in the marginal markup. Therefore, the crowding
out conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied.
Our analysis is intuitively appealing since green firms only increase their abatement if further
product differentiation is profitable. Green product differentiation is possible if consumers are willing
to pay a relatively high markup for voluntary abatement. Following Arora and Gangopadhyay
(1995), green market consumers are willing to pay a greater amount for abatement if they have a
relatively high income. If consumers in the green market have relatively low incomes, their marginal
willingness to pay is more sensitive to mandated abatement, and green firms will be less able to
differentiate their products following regulation.
8.3 Using Consumer Income To Identify The Level Of Regulation In The Pres-
ence Of A Green Market
We now apply the insights regarding the link between changes in the markup following regulation
and consumer income levels in the green market to the issue of regulation in the presence of green
preferences. Our goal is to develop a rule-of-thumb for determining whether traditional regulatory
strategies are likely to over- or under-regulate the competitive market.
8.3.1 Traditional Regulation vs Regulation In A Green Market With High Income
Consumers
If consumers in the green market have relatively high incomes, green firms increase their abatement
following regulation. The relevant first order condition for choosing mandatory abatement is given
by equation (15).
The first order condition consists of three different terms: the net changes in environmental
quality, brown firm profits, and green firm profits. Letting ∂piB(zB)/∂zB denote the change in
brown profits and ∂piG(zG(zB))/∂zB the change in green profits, we rewrite equation (15) as:
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∂v(zB, zG(zB))
∂zB
+
∂v(zB, zG(zB))
∂zG(zB)
∂zG(zB)
∂zB
= −
∂piB(zB)
∂zB
−
∂piG(zG(zB))
∂zB
. (18)
From Proposition 3, in the no crowding out case, optimal profits for green firms decrease.
Therefore the net change in green profits is negative (or −∂piG(zG(zB))/∂zB is positive). The net
change in brown firm profits is not known. However, for a given change in the competitive market
price and for a given production technology, the change in brown profits is constant.17 We can use
the relative income level of consumers in the green market to identify the relative magnitudes of
the increase in environmental quality in the green market and the decrease in profits in the green
market. By comparing the relative magnitudes of the increase in environmental quality and the
decrease in green profits to the first order condition for the traditional regulator, we determine
whether or not the traditional regulator sets the level of mandatory abatement too low or too high.
If consumer income in the green market is relatively high, the loss in green profits is likely to be
large following regulation. The decrease in the total markup is large when consumer income levels
are high, and this decrease becomes larger as relative income levels in the green market increase.
Thus, the price received by green firms decreases substantially following regulation. This decrease
results in a large decrease in green profits and the decrease in profits increases as relative incomes
increase. Thus, relatively high income in the green market results in a large loss in profits following
regulation.
Next, consider the magnitude of the increase in environmental quality in the green market. If
consumer income levels are relatively high, the total and marginal markup is relatively high at every
level of abatement compared to a green market with relatively low income consumers. Thus, the
pre-regulation level of voluntary abatement is likely to be relatively large, i.e., z∗G1 is large. The
change in the marginal markup following regulation is likely to be small. Therefore, the increase
in environmental quality from the increase in voluntary abatement by the green firm is likely to be
small.
Combining the large decrease in green firm profits with the small increase in voluntary abate-
ment, we compare the abatement condition in the traditional setting, equation (12) and the abate-
ment condition with a green market, equation (18). We find that traditional regulation likely sets
the level of abatement too high in the presence of a green market. For a given change in brown firm
profits, the marginal benefit of regulation with a green market is larger than the marginal benefit
of traditional regulation by the increase in green market abatement. The marginal cost is larger
by the decrease in green firm profits. Since the loss in green market profits is likely to be large,
while the increase in green market abatement is likely to be small, compared to the traditional
regulation case, the marginal cost of regulation is substantially higher in the presence of a green
market, while the marginal benefit is not. The traditional regulator substantially underestimates
the costs of regulation, and over-regulates the competitive market relative to the level that accounts
for green preferences.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. If green market consumers have relatively high
17Both the competitive market price and production technology are exogenous to the firm.
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income levels, then green firms have a strong incentive to differentiate their products as being en-
vironmentally friendly, since consumers are willing to pay a high price for green products. When
the regulator reduces green firms’ ability to differentiate their products, it follows that green firms
experience a substantial decline in profits. Even though green firms pursue further voluntary abate-
ment following regulation, the increase is environmental quality most likely is small. Therefore,
while the increase in environmental quality in the green market amplifies the environmental effect
of regulation, the loss in green market profits outweighs the environmental benefits. The resulting
level of regulation that accounts for green preferences is therefore lower than in the traditional case.
8.3.2 Traditional Regulation vs Regulation In A Green Market With Low Income
Consumers
We now compare traditional regulation to the level of regulation in the presence of a green market
for the low income case. When consumer income in the green market is relatively low, the marginal
markup decreases substantially following regulation. Thus the green firm decreases its voluntary
abatement substantially. This decrease in abatement implies a large increase in output of the
commodity good (since production is decreasing in abatement). The decrease in the total markup
is likely to be relatively small, and it is unclear as to whether the increase in the competitive
market price is greater or less than the decrease in the total markup. For a given increase in
the competitive market price, it is likely that the change in the price received by the green firm,
[P (zB) + Ω(zG(zB), zB)], is small. Since the decrease in voluntary abatement is large, the increase
in green profits is likely to be large.18 Thus, when consumer incomes are relatively low, it is likely
that the green firm substantially decreases its voluntary abatement following regulation and obtains
a large increase in profits.
Comparing the first order condition in equation (18) to the traditional regulator’s first order
condition, equation (12), it is unclear as to whether the increase in the marginal benefit of regulation
is larger or smaller than the increase in the marginal cost. Therefore, it is not clear as to whether
the traditional regulator over- or under-regulates, relative to regulation in the presence of a green
market.
Assuming that the purpose of regulation is to improve environmental quality, it is clear that
in the low income case, the large reduction in voluntary abatement following regulation drastically
dampens and possibly negates the improvements in environmental quality gained from mandatory
abatement. From a strictly environmental perspective, the regulator must use caution when set-
ting the level of mandatory abatement if consumer income in the green market is relatively low.
Regulation may potentially result in only marginal improvements in environmental quality, if not a
reduction in environmental quality.
18Profits are determined by the equilibrium price and quantity. If the equilibrium price remains relatively constant,
but equilibrium quantity increases substantially, the increase in profits is likely to be large.
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8.4 Income Inequality And Mandatory Regulation
We take the income levels of consumers in the competitive market as a fixed, benchmark level,
with which to compare the level of incomes in the green market. Thus, variation in green market
income levels implies differences in social income inequality: high income consumers in the green
market implies greater social income inequality. If consumers in the green market have relatively
low incomes, social income inequality is lower.
When social income inequality is large, the traditional regulator likely over-regulates the com-
petitive market, yet total environmental quality is relatively high following regulation. Relatively
high environmental quality follows from the increase in voluntary abatement following regulation. It
is safe, strictly from an environmental perspective, to regulate the competitive market when income
inequality is high.
However, when income inequality is relatively low, it is unclear as to whether or not a traditional
regulator over- or under-regulates the competitive market. Regulation is potentially unable to
sufficiently influence environmental quality, or in the perverse case lowers environmental quality,
since the reduction in voluntary abatement counteracts improvements in environmental quality
from regulated brown firms. Therefore, mandatory regulation may be ineffective in the presence of
a green market when social income inequality is relatively low. On the other hand, a green market
implies that environmental quality is higher in the absence of regulation compared to the analogous
setting without a green market.
9 Conclusion
The lessons from the model presented in this paper are the following. First, we reaffirm the results
of Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995) that credible regulatory threats are not necessary to induce
voluntary abatement from profit maximizing firms. Rather, when there is a green market, firms
have the incentive to voluntarily decrease their emissions to differentiate their products from others.
However, contrary to Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), we show that mandatory abatement need
not always compel green firms to increase their voluntary abatement to further differentiate their
product. Rather, increased voluntary abatement seems to be the special case, occurring when the
marginal markup does not diminish substantially following regulation.
Second, we show that when brown firms are able to collectively share the costs of abatement
with consumers through an increase in the competitive market price, brown profits may rise and
brown firms may support regulation.
Third, the level of regulation depends critically on the reaction of the green market to regulation
in the competitive market, regardless of the fact that mandatory abatement is not binding for green
firms. Therefore, the regulatory authority must use caution when imposing mandatory abatement in
the presence of a green market. In the extreme case, regulation in the competitive market decreases
the overall level of abatement if voluntary abatement falls far enough to offset the improvements in
environmental quality from regulation.
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Relative income levels of consumers in the green market can be helpful in determining whether
or not traditional regulatory policies will likely be effective in the presence of a green market. We
hypothesize that when social income inequality is high, traditional regulatory policies likely over-
regulate the competitive market, but total environmental quality is relatively high. Conversely,
when social income inequality is relatively low, abatement from traditional regulatory policies may
not be far from the optimal level, however total environmental quality is relatively low.
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